We are concerned with the dangers arising from excessive international debt overhang, primarily to financial stability in the debtor country. Assuming that debt forgiveness is not possible, a subject which we modelled earlier relating to the Greek debt crisis, (Goodhart et al. (2018) ), we show how an independent monetary policy can be used to smooth consumption for both borrowers and lenders. A counter-cyclical monetary policy can contract liquidity when debt growth is high and expand liquidity when default rates are high. These results are closely related to the policy debate on monetary policy as a macroprudential policy tool.
Introduction
This paper considers a counterfactual environment where an independent Czech monetary policy is used to stabilise credit conditions in the Czech Republic.
Such policies are shown to perform a similar role to debt-forgiveness policies highlighted in Goodhart et al. (2016) , and have similar results: both lender and borrower consumption paths are stabilised over the business cycle. 1 We abstract from these, but also limit ourselves by not allowing inflation to play a redistributive role, either through direct wealth effects, or through affecting the real value of debt.
In fact, we focus only on the liquidity aspect of monetary policy and the channel through which it affects real trade.
In this paper we examine the interaction between a set of debtors, whom we characterize as Czechs, and a set of creditors, whom we term Europeans. We outline the circumstances that may make the Czech debtors choose to renege, to default, on their unsecured debt, dependent on the various costs which such default entails. The costs and benefits of default are quite complex, and we have modelled these carefully. In our model, creditors (Europeans) can be more or less tough, (forgiving being the inverse of tough), in imposing penalties on the defaulting Czechs. We model this as a 'recovery' rate, whereby the European creditors can grab, and use for themselves (i.e. recover), a larger share (a higher recovery rate), of the underlying defaulted assets.
Most of the debate on the costs/benefits of default and renegotiation have primarily focussed on the effects and trade-offs for the debtors', while the effects on creditors have largely been ignored, or assumed to be negative 2 .
The language of the discussion has been couched within the framework of a "zero-sum" game, and in other words the assumption that any debt relief to debtors must entail a (net present value) transfer of resources from creditors.
We show that, if policies of debt renegotiation or forgiveness such as those discussed in Goodhart et al. (2016) are not available, then an independent monetary policy that varies appropriately over the business cycle can achieve similar results. Specifically, the volatility of both debtors and creditors consumption will fall.
From the early 1990s, the transition of the Czech economy from a planned to a market one resulted in significant foreign direct investment. The largest part of this investment was contributed to the banking and financial sectors, with up to 97% of banking assets being owned by foreign investors.
3 At the same time, the Czech National Bank statistics indicate that one fourth of total liabilities are owed to non-residents, which accounts nearly 95% of GDP 4 , a number increasing rapidly in recent years. While the Czech Republic ran a positive net export of 4.6% of GDP for 2006-2015, it ran a negative overall cur-rent account of -1.5% of GDP for the same period.
5 These large gross external liabilities indicate the fragility of the Czech economy, and its susceptibility to changes in the external funding environment even if Czech banks satisfy the capital requirement buffer of 10.5% with excess 6 , a small negative shock could trigger a huge economic downturn with currency crisis and default crisis, which are positively correlated.
In our model we assume that the Czech capital stock, in addition to internal financing, is externally financed by inflation-indexed unsecured debt. Failure to honour the debt would invoke bankruptcy proceedings in which case the lender has a limited claim on the existing wealth of the borrower and cannot invoke bankruptcy proceedings. Thus a key feature of the paper is that the possibility of default in equilibrium exists on unsecured debt. We assume that
Czech households can only issue inflation-indexed non-state-contingent bonds.
Debtors may choose to renege on some of their debt obligations, but then suffer a renegotiation cost. In order to be able to borrow again, they must pay this cost and, in this sense, the decision to default is strategic. In our model, the possibility of default is micro-founded on the moral hazard relationship problem between debtors and creditors. If debtors default, they incur a welfare cost in renegotiations proportional to the scale of default. This cost effectively creates a borrowing constraint and stems from Shubik and Wilson. (1977) and Dubey et al. (2005) and applied in Tsomocos (2003) , Goodhart et al. (2005) and Goodhart et al. (2006) . In the RBC literature, our model shares similar features to De Walque et al. (2010) . Our closest methodological precursors are Peiris and Tsomocos (2015) 
The Model
The economy consists of 2 countries, Czech Republic (the borrower) and the European Union (the lender), each inhabited by a continuum of identical infinitely lived agents. European households receive income from a portfolio of Czech and non-Czech assets. We simplify the nature of income generated from non-Czech assets, so European household decisions we model should be viewed as the marginal decisions affected by interactions with Czech financial assets, with income and expenditure decisions from non-Czech financial and economic interactions taken as given. As we assume a single homogenous good in the world economy, all trade balance effects are subsumed in the capital account.
There is one fundamental source of uncertainty in our economy: shocks to Czech Total Factor Productivity (A). Fluctuations in TFP also determine various policy rules we consider for the recovery rate on outstanding debt: the recovery rate (κ). We study the impact of TFP shocks only, because we believe that after the initial crisis episode in 2009, the economy continued to maintain the same fundamental characteristics. In particular, we believe the economy was subject to regular TFP shocks. Certainly it experienced many other shocks including to the political environment (domestic and foreign, such as the refugee crisis) and the global economic environment. We believe that studying them and their implications for creditor debt policies would be additional to studying the more fundamental TFP shocks the country experienced.
Finally, any shocks that reduce the capital stock and/or national income directly that do not depend on the business cycle can be summarised within the TFP shock we model.
The European Union
European households are assumed to have an outside source of income which does not depend on the loan portfolio extended to Czech Republic, and reflects their total net foreign assets (NFA). In addition, they purchase one-period inflation-indexed unsecured bonds issued by Czechs. Unsecured bonds are risky and there is an expected repayment rate associated with each bond.
Preferences include a CRRA utility function for consumption.
EU t+s
Each period European Union households earn income, from their (ex Czech Republic) net foreign assets and net Czech assets, and allocate it between 7 consumption (c EU t ) and new assets. Specifically 9 ,
The ex-Czech Net Foreign Asset position of European households is calibrated and assumed to evolve exogenously (a constant). The return on the NFA portfolio is also assumed to be exogenous and constant. 10 Recall that κ is the recovery rate on unsecured debt defaulted upon. It is exogenous to the model, but is interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation between creditors and debtors.
The maximisation programme yields
where ψ EU t is the marginal utility of consumption of European households and
) is the net delivery rate including the an-9 This quadratic adjustment term (adj EU s ) is used to guarantee that secured debt holdings converge back to steady state values.
10 One may think of this as the fruit of a non-stochastic Lucas tree. It is taken as a constant in order to isolate the marginal effect on European consumption of their Czech portfolio, independent of unrelated fluctuations in total European income. More importantly, we do not allow European lenders to have alternative opportunities to invest savings. However, the supply of loans is not elastic as Europeans still have a legitimate consumption-savings decision, but the trade-off itself is limited to investments in Czech Republic. Nevertheless, alternative investment opportunities would provide a richer framework to study the supply of loans to Czech Republic. 8 nounced rate of default and the recovery rate. Note that European households care about the rate of return net-of-default and recovery. In the steady state, the net-of-default rate of return on loans is simply the rate of time preference.
Note that in the deterministic steady state
Czech Republic
The Czech economy is represented by Czech households who wholly own firms in a competitive industry that identically has access to a production technology which uses capital (cap CZ t ) and labour (lab CZ t ) as inputs. The production function is Cobb-Douglas and has constant returns to scale, with an income share of a and 1 − a to capital and labour respectively
Capital depreciates at a rate of δ % each period and labour is paid a competitive wage w
A is the total factor productivity and ε
is an autoregressive process with shock u A t . As there is a representative firm, National Production or GDP, is defined as
Czech firms are
9 Firms maximise profits each period which results in factor prices being determined at their marginal product values
Czech households access the international debt market and issue unsecured (b CZ u ) claims at competitive interest rate (R u are the gross rates) in order to finance consumption and investment decisions. Crucially, they decide how much of their debt obligation to repay.
If they do not honour their unsecured debt completely, they incur a nonpecuniary punishment, or utility cost, proportional to the amount they default upon, which reflects the costs involved in renegotiating the outstanding amount. Furthermore, lenders are able to seize a fraction (κ) of the outstanding debt from the new capital stock. We will conduct our normative policy analysis on four different descriptions of the path of the recovery rate, κ.
There is a liquidity requirement for Czech households which specifies that purchases of consumption and capital goods must be financed by domestic 
The budget constraints can be combined, and the price level factored out, to obtain
where c CZ is consumption, unsecured and secured debt issued is b respectively, at a gross interest rate of (R u ) and (R s ) respectively, and the proportion of unsecured outstanding debt repaid is (1−def
is the amount lenders seize from the new capital stock, and
is the cost of adjusting unsecured debt away from steady state levels and can be interpreted as the cost of renegotiating a different level of unsecured debt.
We allow the capital stock to be substitutable with income, and as a consequence there is no non-negativity constraint on re-investment. The preferences include a CRRA utility function for consumption and disutilities from supplying labour and from renegotiating defaulted upon debt. The decision variables are c, lab, b s , b u , def, cap.
and permits the usual recursive representation. The recursive representation of preferences is
The renegotiation cost enforced on firms that choose to default on def GRC t % of their unsecured debt is
where Ω CZ t is a pro-cyclical macro-variable which governs the severity of the punishment enforced and ζ → 0 is an infinitesimally small positive number 12 .
is given by also appears in the denominator as it allows us to consider the marginal effect of the decision of an individual firm on the aggregate cost of default to the whole economy. The inverse of the leverage ratio in the previous period also enters as the ratio of the aggregate capital stock to the aggregate debt due.
As a consequence, Ω CZ t turns out to be procyclical, i.e. with a high cost (high value) in good times and a low cost (low value) in depressions. To see this, note that when the capital stock is growing, the leverage ratio is high, with the capital to debt ratio becoming low, and the shadow cost of default to the borrower Ω CZ t is low. When the shadow cost of default is low, the firms default rate is likely to be higher (all else being equal). was constant, the marginal cost of default,
13 In richer models, where there are heterogenous productive sectors, default in one sector will cause default in others: the chain reaction of default can exacerbate the financial difficulties of a relatively small sector of the economy into an economy-wide contagion. Our macroeconomic variable, Ω captures this notion that industries are linked and default is amplified as it spreads. An analogy is that if one room of a house floods, the entire house is likely to be flooded.
13
here renegotiation, is proportional to the quantity in arrears. This alone would allow us to obtain a stationary solution. In contrast, Walsh (2015a) and Walsh (2015b) have Ω CZ t as a function of household wealth. As this is dynamic, so is Ω CZ t . However, there, this is necessary in order to obtain a stationary solution as the marginal cost of default is still linear in Ω CZ t . This is not so in our case.
We obtain stationarity by having the marginal cost proportional to the quantity of default, however this alone would mean that the propensity to default decreases as the quantity of debt outstanding increases. The specification we have chosen for Ω CZ t negates this, as it falls when default rates and the stock of debt grows, hence increasing the propensity to default when the stock of debt grows, addressing the empirical findings in the literature 14 .
The optimisation yields the following first order conditions, with ψ CZ t defined as the shadow value of income:
(20)
Equation 18 is the FOC wrt to labour supplied while 19 is the FOC wrt capital and states that the shadow value of capital equals the marginal effect of capital 14 As in Benjamin and Wright (2013) 14 on profits plus the increase in future capital stock. 20 is the FOC with respect to unsecured debt and states that the marginal benefit of debt in increasing the shadow value of capital is equated to the marginal cost of reducing profits by the repayment rate and the renegotiation cost of increasing the quantity of debt subject to default. Equation 21 is the FOC with respect to the repayment rate on loans and equalises the marginal cost on profits of repaying an additional percent of debt to the marginal benefit of reducing the renegotiation cost of defaulting.
Equations 20 and 21 can be combined to give
Monetary Fiscal Authority
The counterfactual Czech monetary fiscal authority sets a period-by-period short-term interest rate i t , exchanges money for bonds and runs a period-byperiod non-Ricardian seingiorage policy (fiscal policy). Formally, they select a priori the nominal value of seingiorage transferred to households each period at T t = τ t . The flow budget constraints are
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As a consequence
4 Market Clearing
Monetary Policy Rule
In our simulations, we consider nominal Czech interest rate governed by Taylor rule, where the Monetary Authority pays attention to interest rate and output gap:
In our analysis we contrast this policy rule with a static regime where
Moreover, in order to compare quantitive aspects, we consider two different regimes of Taylor rule: low sensitive to output gap and high sensitive one.
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Our calibration follows closely that of Goodhart et al. (2016) . The unsecured rate 1.17% annum, which implies about 0.30% per quarter. This compares with the average Czech 10 year bond yield from January 2013 to December 2017. 15 The recovery rate on Czech debt securities was taken from Altman et al. (1999) who estimated that the recovery rate on securities with AA rating is 0.60 (Average Price) and 0.76 (Weighted Average Price) -we have taken the weighted average point of 0.76. The default rates was defined as the share of non-performing loans from total loans and was taken from the Czech National Bank, which gave the mean and standard deviation as 5.52% and 0.74% annum, respectively. Since we consider a quarterly simulation, the mean and standard deviation default rates is 1.3% and 0.7364% per quarter in the acyclical case while for unsecured debt repayment rates, the mean and standard deviations in our economy are 99.7% and 0.1767% per quarter in the acyclical regime, given the repayment rate includes a recovery rate of 76%. The present value of the debt forgiven is around 17.5%, using the model unsecured interest rate.
These were set by choosing the default wedge, φ, to be 1/.987 and the default accelerator, γ, to be .93 to obtain higher volatility in default decisions and obtain counter-cyclical effects of default. The standard deviation of the shock (u A ) is 1%, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, is 2, following Aliyev et al. (2014) . In the same paper, the private depreciation rate of capital was Table 2 below shows the parameterisation of the economy.
Business Cycle Properties
In this section 17 we simulate the 2nd order approximate version of the economy and study the business cycle properties of our economy. We then examine the impulse responses of our policy regimes. 
Concluding Remarks
Debt forgiveness for Greece which we studied in Goodhart et al. (2018) 
